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The Theory of Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and
Acceptance
Alice Férot*
The theory of loss of chance has a distinctive feature: wherever it
is implemented, it tends to be, at least initially, misunderstood or
1
somewhat distorted, thus hindering its acceptance. In this respect, the
United States is no different than other countries that have adopted
2
it. The reticence in the United States toward the theory of loss of
3
chance, however, has remained acute over the years.
The theory of loss of chance allows an aggrieved party to assert a
claim against a tortfeasor whose conduct decreased or eliminated the
4
chance of a favorable outcome. Accordingly, the theory may apply to

∗ Juris Doctor, Florida International University College of Law, 2012, LL.M. graduate, New
York University School of Law, 2008. I would like to extend special thanks to Professor Christy
Hayes, my faculty advisor, for her invaluable guidance and to Rafael Ribeiro, my husband, for his
continued support throughout my law school years.
1 For example, in France in the 1970s and in Italy in the 1980s, when the theory of loss of
chance was in its infancy, the theory was heavily criticized and misunderstood, even though in
both countries the theory is now widely accepted and implemented in many diverse areas. See,
e.g., Claire Beraud, Le principe de la Réparation de la Perte de Chance [Indemnification of the
Loss of Chance] 17 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.droit.univparis5.fr/AOCIVCOM/01memoir/BeraudM.pdf; Luca D’Apollo, Perdita di Chance: Danno
Risarcibile, Onus Probandi e Criteri di Liquidazione [Loss of Chance: Compensable Injury, Burden
of
Proof
and
Assessment
Criteria],
ALTALEX
(Nov.
26,
2007),
http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=39075#sdendnote16anc.
2
For example, a number of courts continue to frame the issue of the loss of chance as a
theory of causation rather than a theory of injury. See, e.g., Mandros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304,
310 (R.I. 2008) (holding that the theory of loss of chance is an alternative to conventional notions of causation).
3
A majority of states reject the theory of loss of chance. See, e.g., McAfee v. Baptist Med.
Ctr., 641 So. 2d 265, 267 (Ala. 1994); Crosby v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 924, 930 (Alaska
1999); Holt ex rel. Estate of Holt v. Wagner, 43 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Ark. 2001); Williams v. Wraxall,
39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 666 (Cal. Ct App. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a (West) (abrogating Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.1 (abrogating Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 366 (S.D.2000)).
4
The definition given by Black’s Law Dictionary is the following: a rule in some states
providing a claim against a doctor who has engaged in medical malpractice that, although it does
not result in a particular injury, decreases or eliminates the chance of surviving or recovering
from the preexisting condition for which the doctor was consulted. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1031 (9th ed. 2009).
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a number of situations, including the loss of an opportunity for promo5
tions in an employment discrimination case, or the loss of an oppor6
tunity to make a profit in a breach of contract case. In the United
States, the theory of loss of chance has been implemented mostly in
7
the area of medical malpractice. Usually, a patient, or his or her representative, will sue a healthcare provider for a failure to diagnose or a
failure to cure a medical condition that resulted in the diminution of
8
the patient’s chance to survive or recover from the condition.
The theory seems to have first appeared as early as 1966 when
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly addressed it in the sem9
inal case Hicks v. United States. In Hicks, the Court held that a physician’s failure to diagnose an intestinal obstruction of a patient was
10
negligence. The Court held that “[i]f there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answer11
able.”
A few years later, in 1974, a New York case also addressed the is12
sue of loss of chance. In Beth Israel, the New York Supreme Court
held that a patient who died from an aneurism could recover for the
5
See Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the theory of loss of
chance is “peculiarly appropriate in employment cases involving competitive promotion,” but
refusing to hold that the theory was applicable to the case because the issue had not been briefed
by the parties).
6
See Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that it is
now an “accepted principle of contract law . . . that recovery will be allowed where a plaintiff has
been deprived of an opportunity or chance to gain an award or profit even where damages are
uncertain”). In Miller, an insurer had breached a promise to return a wrecked automobile which
the insured needed as evidence in a planned products liability suit against a manufacturer. Id. at
25. The Court held that the insured could recover against the insurer for the lost chance of winning the product liability case. Id. at 29.
7
See, e.g., Hardy v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 1996910 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Okla. 1996) (limiting the
application of the theory of loss of chance to medical malpractice cases); see also Frey v. AT&T
Mobility, LLC, 379 F. App’x 727, 729 (10th Cir. 2010).
8
See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Iowa 1986) (finding that the physician, who had failed to diagnose breast cancer, had caused his patient to lose chances of survival).
9
Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 628-30 (4th Cir. 1966).
10 Id. at 632.
11 Id.
12 Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff’d, 337 N.E.2d
128, 128 (1975); see also Zaven T. Saroyan, The Current Injustice of the Loss of Chance Doctrine:
An Argument for A New Approach to Damages, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 22 (2003) (“Israel Hospital
became the first case to expressly announce this doctrine.”); Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of
Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay for Human Life, 42 S.D.L. REV. 279, 287-88 (1997); Darrell
L. Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modern Proportional Approach to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L.
REV. 759, 765 (1992). It should also be noted that courts have addressed the issue of loss of
chance of profit in breach of contract actions well before the Beth Israel case. See Robert H.
Sturgess, The “Loss of Chance” Doctrine of Damages for Breach of Contract, FLA. B.J., October
2005, at 29 (finding that Taylor v. Bradley, 39 N.Y. 129 (1868) was the first instance where a court
was faced with a loss of chance in a suit for breach of contract).
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loss of 20% to 40% chance of survival due to the defendants’ failure
13
to give the patient a medication. The Court, however, awarded dam14
ages for the ultimate outcome, the death, not the loss of chance. At
the time, the decision attracted little attention and the Court of Ap15
peals affirmed without opinion.
16
In 1978, in Hamil v. Bashline, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was one of the first courts to rely on section 323 of the Restatement of Torts to expand the increased risk of harm to instances of loss
17
of chance. In Hamil, the wife of the decedent brought a wrongful
death action against a hospital for failure to properly treat her hus18
band’s myocardial infarction. The Court vacated and remanded a
trial court order because the jury had been wrongly instructed that the
loss of chance could not be considered a proximate cause of the pa19
tient’s death.
In 1981, Professor Joseph H. King wrote the first scholarly article
in the United States dealing with the loss of chance in the Yale Law
20
Journal. Professor King theorized that “the loss of a chance of
achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse consequence
21
should be compensable.” He advocated for a “reevaluation of the
traditional ways of thinking about the interest for which relief is
22
sought and the role of chance in valuing that interest.” Professor
King, however, formulated the theory of loss in chance in terms of
23
causation and burden of proof, not in terms of injury.
To this day, the American Law Institute (ALI), the independent
organization producing “Restatements” of law to clarify, modernize,
24
25
and otherwise improve the law, has taken no position on the issue.
The cases discussed above have been followed by numerous state
26
supreme court decisions on the loss of chance. While not every state

13

Kallenberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
Id. at 509.
15 Id., aff’d, 337 N.E.2d 128, 128 (1975).
16 Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1283.
19 Id. at 1289-90.
20 Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1370 (1981).
21 Id. at 1354.
22 Id. at 1370.
23 Id. at 1354.
24 ALI Overview, ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited June 9, 2013).
25 Tory A. Weigand, Lost Chances, Felt Necessities, and the Tale of Two Cities, 43 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 327, 352 (2010).
14
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has addressed the theory of loss of chance, those that have, implement
27
28
it in very different ways. Three trends can be identified: some states
29
recognize the theory; some states refuse to recognize it and instead
indemnify the loss of the favorable outcome through the use of a re30
laxed causation requirement; and some states refuse to indemnify for
31
loss of chance. In some instances, confusion surrounding its application remains. The loss of chance is not a theory of causation but a
32
theory of injury. In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff claiming
a loss of chance must prove that the physician’s negligence caused the
33
injury, which is a decreased chance of recovery. As a result, the endorsement or rejection of the theory should not be based on arguments relating to the applicable causation standard or burden of
proof. This comment is an attempt to clarify the theory and to address
how and why some jurisdictions may have misunderstood it. This
comment also encourages these states to either recognize or reject the
damage of loss of chance but in a manner that does not distort the
theory, and in a manner compatible with the applicable standard of
causation and burden of proof.
This comment will first address (I) the nature of the theory of loss
of chance, then (II) its uneven implementation in the United States
among the fifty states.
I. THE LOSS OF CHANCE: A THEORY OF INJURY
The core concept of the theory is the recognition that a loss of
34
chance is in itself an injury. Because a chance has some inherent
value, a tortious deprivation of chance should trigger the tortfeasor’s

26 See, e.g., Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316, 324-25 (W. Va. 1983); Gooding v. Univ.
Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d
605 (Ariz. 1984); Brown v. Koulizakis, 331 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Va. 1985).
27 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS, 272-73 (Foundation Press, 11th ed., 2005).
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008).
30 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
31 See, e.g., Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1015.
32 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 823 (holding that the loss of chance is a theory of injury, not
causation).
33 See id.
34 Id. (holding that the loss of chance is a theory of injury, not causation); Jorgenson v.
Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 370 (S.D. 2000) (“Courts that adopt the loss of chance doctrine in effect
recognize a lost chance as a distinct cause of action, treating it as the compensable injury, not the
underlying injury itself.”).
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35

liability. Once the principle that a loss of chance is an injury worthy
36
37
of redress is accepted, the traditional concepts of tort apply.
A. The Elements of the Theory
In a typical loss of chance case, the plaintiff must prove the traditional elements of negligence: (1) an injury; (2) the defendant’s breach
38
of a duty of care; and (3) causality between the injury and the breach.
1. The Injury
To recover for a loss of chance, the plaintiff must prove that she
39
or he initially had at least some chance of a favorable outcome. Accordingly, no action will lie if the patient had no chance of a favorable
40
outcome before the tortious action occurred. In Broussard v. United
41
States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
decision denying recovery for a loss of chance when the patient had
no chance of survival. The parents of a three-year-old boy sued a hospital employee for medical malpractice under the Federal Tort Claims
Act because the employee had failed to promptly treat the child upon
42
his arrival. After a bench trial, the district court found that the parents could not recover for loss of chance of their son because the
“[child]’s injuries were so severe and so extensive that nothing could
43
have been done for him that would have saved his life.” In other
words, even with prompt and proper treatment, the child could not
have survived. Therefore, the negligence of the employee could not
44
have caused the loss of a chance the child never had.

35 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 823 (holding that the loss of chance doctrine views a person’s
prospects for surviving a serious medical condition as something of value).
36 Jorgenson, 616 N.W.2d at 370.
37 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828-29 (holding that Massachusetts joins the majority of
states who have endorsed the theory “to ensure that the fundamental aims and principles of
[Massachusetts] tort law remain fully applicable to the modern world of sophisticated medical
diagnosis and treatment”).
38 See id. at 823 (finding that the recognition of the theory of loss of chance comports with
the common law of wrongful death)
39 See Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 172 (5th Cir. 1993).
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 172-74.
43 Id. at 178.
44 This principle according to which a healthcare provider cannot be liable for an outcome
that would have occurred even in the absence of negligence is not limited to loss of chance cases.
See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202, 1218 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the cause of a
child’s death was the lethal dose of aspirin the child accidently absorbed and not the subsequent
physician’s failure to diagnose the poisoning nor the physician’s prescription of aspirin because
the condition of the child was already hopeless before the negligent act).
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Likewise, a plaintiff will not recover for a loss of chance if the
negligence of the physician, in fact, caused the unfavorable outcome.
If the patient had a 100% chance to be cured or saved and the tortious
act of the physician caused all this chance to be lost, then the tortfea45
sor is responsible for the unfavorable outcome, not the loss of chance.
Additionally, the loss of chance causes an injury independent
from the unfavorable outcome. The loss of chance is the original injury. It is abstract and contains some uncertainty: the loss of chance
may or may not have caused the adverse outcome. Even when the
unfavorable outcome is realized, this uncertainty remains. Accordingly, under the theory, the plaintiff is not required to prove with certainty that the unfavorable outcome would have been avoided if the
46
chance had not been lost. In Hamil, where the wife of the decedent
brought a wrongful death action against a hospital for failure to properly treat her husband, who had suffered a heart attack, the court held
that the law “does not require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that
the patient would have lived had [the patient] been hospitalized and
47
48
operated on promptly.” Similarly, in Hicks v. United States, where a
physician mistakenly diagnosed a deadly intestinal obstruction as gastroenteritis, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when a defendant’s tortious conduct terminates a person’s chance of survival, “it
does not lie in the defendant’s mouth to raise conjectures as to the
measure of the chances that he has put beyond the possibility of reali49
zation.” This is because, the Court further stated, “[r]arely is it possible to demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to
50
pass.” Requiring that the patient prove he would have lived or re51
covered would be an “unreasonable burden.”
The unfavorable outcome, contrary to the loss of chance, is concrete and certain: it is the state of the patient. While the two injuries,
the loss of chance and the occurring of the adverse outcome, are distinct, they are also complementary: they are both necessary to trigger
52
liability. Recovery for the loss of chance is contingent upon either
45 LeBlanc v. Barry, 790 So. 2d 75, 80-81 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that, where a patient
had 90-100% chance of survival, the trial court in fact considered the patient’s chance of survival,
even if the trial court spoke in terms of an award for wrongful death).
46 Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978).
47 See id.
48 Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966)
49 Id. at 632.
50 Id.
51 Smith v. State, 523 So. 2d 815, 822 (La. 1988).
52 Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56-57 n. 43 (Mich. 1990) (holding that a cause of
action for loss of an opportunity of achieving a better result accrues when harm and damages
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the realization of the unfavorable outcome or the certainty that the
53
unfavorable outcome will occur in the future. For purposes of illustration, if a physician fails to treat a patient who was in critical condition upon his arrival in the hospital, there are only two possible outcomes: either the patient will live or he will die. Assuming that the
patient had a 40% chance of survival upon his arrival and lost a 20%
chance of survival as a result of the delayed treatment, the patient still
has a 20% chance of survival after the negligence. The loss of chance
occurred at the time of the negligence; it is abstract. It is distinct from
the ultimate outcome, which is future and concrete: this is the death or
the survival of the patient. The patient, however, will only recover for
his loss of chance if he both lost chance of survival and ultimately dies
54
or is terminally ill. The unfavorable outcome may take many differ55
ent forms: it might be the death of the patient, aggravated symp56
57
toms, or a lack of improvement of the condition of the patient.
The loss of chance is an injury that also should be distinguished
from other damages resulting from the negligence. These derivative
injuries may include physical pain and suffering, mental anguish resulting from the patient’s awareness that chances of survival were lost,
worsening of the patient’s condition, a longer or more invasive medical treatment, disfigurement, medical expenses, loss of consortium,
society and companionship in a marital relationship, and the shorten58
ing of life. In Alexander v. Scheid, the plaintiff brought a medical
malpractice action against a physician who had failed to diagnose his
lung cancer. At the time of the suit, the cancer was in remission after
59
aggressive treatment. The Supreme Court of Indiana held that the
worsening of the patient’s condition was a compensable injury because, during the time the patient’s cancer remained undiagnosed, she

result from the loss of a substantial opportunity, but noting that the harm, or ultimate outcome, is
not necessarily the death of the patient but could also be the worsening of the patient’s condition
before remission).
53 DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 139 (Iowa 1986) (allowing recovery for a loss of
chance even though the ultimate outcome had yet to pass because the patient’s breast cancer
had spread to her bones and had become incurable); Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 46 (holding that
plaintiff’s loss of chance action accrued at the time the medical accident occurred because, at that
moment, the patient’s death had become ineluctable).
54 Id.
55 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass. 2008) (where the patient died of
cancer after his physician failed to timely diagnose his condition).
56 Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 281 (Ind. 2000) (where the patient’s condition
worsened during the time the physician failed to diagnose a lung cancer).
57 Harris v. Kissling, 721 P.2d 838, 839-40 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (where the hospital’s failure to
inoculate the patient deprived her of a chance to have future healthy children).
58 Alexander, 726 N.E.2d at 272.
59 Id. at 273.
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suffered the destruction of healthy lung tissue, the growth of a cancer60
ous tumor, and the collapse of a lung.
61
In DeBurkarte v. Louvar, where the plaintiff’s physician failed to
timely diagnose breast lumps as cancerous resulting in the loss of any
chance of survival, the Supreme Court of Iowa recognized that past
and future pain and suffering included not only physical pain but also
mental anguish because the patient “knew her cancer was incurable
62
and her days were numbered.” The Court also found that the pa63
tient’s husband was entitled to recovery for lost consortium. The
Court, however, found that the plaintiff had failed to produce substantial evidence on the shortening of her life, which did not prevent re64
covery for her loss of chance. By finding that the plaintiff had a
claim for loss of chance independent of a claim for the shortening of
her life, the Court’s holding supports the argument that the two injuries were distinct.
Once the injury is established, the plaintiff must prove the second
element of negligence, i.e., that the physician breached a duty of care.
2. The Breach of a Duty of Care
The defendant must conform to a standard of care. Typical examples of breach include the late or lack of diagnosis of a medical
65
66
condition or delayed treatment.
The defendant may not be the only person who breached a duty
of care. There might be several tortfeasors who contributed jointly
and severally to the loss of chance, or several tortfeasors who each
contributed to a distinct loss of a percentage of chance. For example,
tortfeasor A may cause the loss of 10% of chance, and tortfeasor B
may cause the loss of another 10% of chance, or tortfeasors A and B
67
jointly may cause the loss of 20% of chance. In fact, plaintiffs in loss
68
of chance cases routinely sue multiple defendants. As the Supreme
69
Court of New Jersey emphasized in Scafidi v. Seiler, the theory of loss

60

Id. at 281.
DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986).
62 Id. at 139.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 135.
65 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash.1983) (late
diagnosis of lung cancer); DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d at 139 (late diagnosis of breast cancer).
66 Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1993) (delayed treatment upon
arrival in the emergency room).
67 See, e.g., Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 44 (1990) (where plaintiff sued her physician, the hospital, and the Nurse anesthetist was named a third-party defendant).
68 See id.
69 Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398 (1990).
61
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of chance is consistent with the principles of comparative negligence
70
as well as the principles of joint-tortfeasor contribution.
Once both the injury and the breach of a duty of care are established, the plaintiff must prove the last element of negligence, i.e., causation.
3. The Causation
The theory of loss of chance, as a theory of injury, is consistent
with the traditional notion of causation. To have a claim for loss of
chance, the plaintiff must prove that the tortfeasor’s negligence caused
the plaintiff’s injury, where the plaintiff’s injury consists of the dimin71
ished likelihood of achieving a favorable outcome.
Causation consists of two elements: causation in fact and legal
72
causation. Causation in fact is the application of the “but for” rule.
There is causation if the event would not have occurred but for the
73
defendant’s conduct. Generally, causation in fact is an issue for the
74
jury. The issue of causation in fact only becomes a question of law
for the court if the plaintiff presented no evidence from which the jury
could reasonably find a causal nexus between the negligent act and
75
the resulting injury.
Legal causation, or proximate cause, determines whether legal liability should be imposed as a matter of law where causation in fact is
76
established. It generally depends upon considerations of common
77
sense and policy. To be the cause of an injury, the negligent act must
occur through “a natural and continuous sequence of events that is
78
unbroken by any effective intervening cause.’ If the chain of causa79
tion is broken, the tortfeasor is relieved from liability.
B.

The False Barriers to the Application of the Theory

Although the theory of loss of chance is consistent with all the
traditional rules of negligence, it does not necessarily appear to be so.
Some obstacles to the recognition of the theory of loss of chance include: (1) the argument that an injury only can be compensated if it is
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 408.
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 832 (Mass. 2008).
Crosby v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (D. Alaska 1999).
McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 470-71 (Ok. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 203 (2013).
Id.
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certain and not speculative; (2) the apparent impossibility of reconciling the theory with the traditional notions of causation; (3) the difficulty in proving a loss of chance; (4) the difficulty in assessing the
amount of the damages; and (5) the creation of a new cause of action
in the area of medical malpractice.
1. The Certainty of the Injury
A plaintiff can recover only for injuries that are certain, not
80
speculative. The loss of chance, as an injury, is often criticized for
81
being no more than a speculative harm. The identification of the in82
jury requires the use of statistical evidence. It requires making assumptions about what should have been the course of events in the
absence of the tortious act. The theory relies on the principle that
there is an inevitable evolution of the medical condition. It introduces
the idea of fate into individual cases and does not take into account
the potential for the patient’s medical condition to have an unusual
path.
Ascertaining the plaintiff’s injury is further complicated by the
fact that statistical evidence may be used in a number of different
ways. For example, when a plaintiff lost his or her chance of survival
and ultimately died, statistics may give information regarding the
chance of survival the plaintiff would have had with proper treat83
ment. In some instances, when the plaintiff cannot prove that she
would have survived with proper treatment, she may still use statistics
on the rate of survival within a specified period of time after the diag84
nosis, e.g., the survival rate for the five years following the diagnosis.
This type of evidence is relevant because the shortening of a life gives
rise to a wrongful death action, and similarly, losing the opportunity to

80 Mohr v. Grantham, 262 P.3d 490, 496 (Wash. 2011) (considering the argument that the
loss of chance is too speculative and holding that this concern is not dissuasive).
81 See id.
82 Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 475 (Wash. 1983) (using
statistical evidence to assess the reduction of chances of survival).
83 See id. (where the estate proved that the hospital and physician’s negligence proximately
caused at 14% reduction in his chances of survival).
84 In Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital, the plaintiff offered undisputed evidence
regarding the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics’ five-stage classification
system for cervical cancer: Cancer diagnosed at “Stage 0” has a 100% five-year survival rate,
diagnosed at “Stage I” has a 95% survival rate, diagnosed at “Stage II” has a 70% to 80% survival rate, diagnosed at “Stage III has slightly less than a 50% survival rate, and finally, cancer
diagnosed at “Stage IV” has only a 0% to 5% survival rate. Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp.,
858 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1993).
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live through a determined period of time gives rise to an action for
85
loss of chance of survival.
As the Supreme Court of Washington emphasized in Herkovits v.
86
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, the statistical data relating to the extent of the patient’s chance of a better outcome are often
only considered to evaluate the amount of damages, rather than to
87
establish proximate cause. The existence of the injury is often readily
ascertainable by a fact-finder without expert testimony or is not dis88
puted by the parties. The disputed issue is the percentage lost.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of sta89
tistics in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, where the defendants urged the
Court to reject the theory of loss of chance because “a statistical like90
lihood of survival is a ‘mere possibility’ and therefore ‘speculative.’”
The Court disagreed with the defendants’ contention by reminding
them that “the magnitude of a probability is distinct from the degree
91
of confidence with which it can be estimated.” The Court recognized
that “[a] statistical survival rate cannot conclusively determine
92
whether a particular patient will survive a medical condition.” The
93
Court, however, stressed that survival rates are not random guesses.
Instead, “[t]hey are estimates based on data obtained and analyzed
scientifically and accepted by the relevant medical community as part
of the repertoire of diagnosis and treatment, as applied to the specific
94
facts of the plaintiff’s case.” There is an increasing use of probabilistic evidence in tort cases and, as a result, in medical malpractice cases.
This type of evidence includes “actuarial tables, assumptions about
present value and future interest rates, statistical measures of future

85 As the Supreme Court of South Dakota stresses,“[I]n all cases death is even more certain than taxes. Only the time and cause of death may be in doubt. If evidence supports a finding that, more probably than not, negligence hastened death, ordinarily a wrongful death action
lies. Should an action lie, also, when evidence supports a finding that, more probably than not,
negligence reduced the patient’s chance of survival?” Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 370
(citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 272 (5th
ed. 1984)). The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative. Jorgenson, 616 N.W.2d
at 371 (“A review of the cases and commentary on the subject persuades us to conclude that a
loss of chance is an actionable injury in our state.”).
86 Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 474.
87 Id. at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 475.
89 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 819 (Mass. 2008).
90 Id. at 833.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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95

harm, and the like.” As the Court pointed out, all these methods of
96
valuation are the “stock-in-trade of tort valuation.”
Even though statistics have become increasingly reliable, they
cannot define with absolute certainty what would have been the outcome of the patient’s condition in the absence of the tortious act. As a
result, compensating on the basis of a statistical proposition either will
overcompensate or undercompensate, depending on how the plaintiff’s medical condition would have evolved in the absence of the tor97
tious conduct. In that respect, loss of chance cases “elude the degree
of certainty one would prefer and upon which the law normally insists
98
before a person may be held liable.”
Allowing recovery for the lost chance, however, is the most equitable approach because “[b]ut for the defendant’s tortious conduct, it
would not have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of
99
chance.” The defendant, having created this uncertainty, should bear
the burden of possibly overcompensating the patient.
2. Reconciliation of the Theory with the Traditional Notions of
Causation
Some courts interpret the loss of chance as a theory allowing partial compensation for an injury when the causation with respect to the
100
tortious act is weak or uncertain. The theory of loss of chance, however, is compatible with and, in fact, requires the application of, the
101
“but-for” rule. But for the negligence of the physician, the loss of
102
chance would not have happened. The theory is not an alternative to
a weak causality with the ultimate outcome. The loss of chance is a sui
generis injury, not a fraction of the ultimate outcome. The traditional
rules of causation apply.

95

Id. at 841.
Id.
97 Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 282 (Ind. 2000).
98 Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa. 1978).
99 DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986).
100 See, e.g., Mandros v. Prescod, 948 A.2d 304, 310 (R.I. 2008) (holding that the loss of
chance is an alternative to conventional notions of causation, and requires a more expansive
interpretation of causation); Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984)
(finding that the theory is a relaxation of the causation requirement).
101 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 843 (Mass. 2008) (holding that a proper instruction to the jury must be that but for the negligence of the defendant, the patient lost a fair
chance of survival).
102 See id.
96
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3. The Burden of Proof
In order to prove loss of chance, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving each element of negligence by the preponderance of the evi103
The plaintiff must show that the tortfeasor’s negligence
dence.
caused “the plaintiff’s likelihood of achieving a more favorable out104
come to be diminished.” In other words, the plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that “the physician’s negligence
caused the plaintiff’s injury, where the injury consists of the dimin105
ished likelihood of achieving a more favorable medical outcome.”
Accordingly, a mere possibility of causation will not be enough for the
106
plaintiff to meet his or her burden. This is where the confusion
107
arises. In a loss of chance case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the negligence caused the loss of chance, but not that the neg108
ligence caused the final outcome. It is possible that the negligence
caused the final outcome, but this is irrelevant because the plaintiff
wants to recover for the loss of chance only.
4. The Evaluation of Damages
Another obstacle to the theory of loss of chance is that a lost
109
chance cannot be quantified. A wrongdoer, however, is not relieved
of the necessity of paying damages merely because damages cannot be
110
assessed with certainty. In many areas of the law, juries are entrusted
with the task of awarding damages for injuries that are not readily
111
calculable. Assessing the value of the loss of chance is not an impossible task.

103 Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1284 (holding that, as in many other areas of the law, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the harm suffered was due to the
conduct of the defendant).
104 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832.
105 Id.
106 Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984).
107 See, e.g., Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 47-48 (1990) (holding that “the more
probable than not standard, as well as other standards of causation, are analytic devices-tools to
be used in making causation judgments,” whereas the more probable than not is a burden of
proof, not a standard of causation).
108 King, supra note 20, at 1363 (“A plaintiff ordinarily should be required to prove by the
applicable standard of proof that the defendant caused the loss in question.”).
109 LeBlanc v. Barry, 790 So. 2d 75, 81 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (admitting that a loss of chance
cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty).
110 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) (holding
that “[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of
damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all
relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer.”).
111 Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 283 (Ind. 2000).
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Generally, the damages are measured with the following method.
First, the percentages of a chance of a favorable outcome pre112
Second, the postnegligence and post-negligence are assessed.
negligence percentage of a favorable outcome is subtracted from pre113
negligence percentage of a favorable outcome. The resulting amount
is the percentage of the chance lost. Third, this net percentage of
chance obtained is multiplied by the total amount of damages that
114
ordinarily are allowed for the unfavorable outcome.
This is the
115
amount that plaintiff will recover. This is the “proportional award
116
method.” The award is proportional to the value of the ultimate out117
come.
In the example presented earlier in this comment, where a patient had 40% chance of survival and lost 20% chance as a result of
the negligence, the calculation would be done using the following
method. The post-negligence percentage of a favorable outcome, i.e.,
20% is subtracted from pre-negligence percentage of a favorable outcome, i.e., 40%. The percentage of chance lost is 20%. Then, the jury
will determine the amount of recovery for a wrongful death. Assuming that the jury estimated this amount to $1 million, this amount shall
be multiplied with the percentage of chance lost. The resulting
amount is $200,000. This is what the plaintiff or his estate will recover.
This method of evaluation has been criticized, mostly for rou118
tinely over or undercompensating the patients.
However, most
courts have determined that the so-called “proportional award
method” is the most appropriate method to assess the value of the loss
of chance for a more favorable outcome because “it is an easily applied calculation that fairly ensures that a defendant is not assessed
119
damages for harm that he did not cause.”
The Supreme Court of Michigan adopted “the substantial possibility approach,” which is a variation of the proportional award
120
method. Under this approach, the plaintiff will recover the same
amount as under the proportional award method but only if the plain121
tiff can show that the chances lost were substantial. If the chances
112

Atterholt v. Herbst, 879 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 840 (Mass. 2008).
117 Atterholt, 879 N.E.2d at 1226.
118 See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
605, 631-633 (2001).
119 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 840.
120 Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 56 (Mich. 1990).
121 Id.
113
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lost were not substantial, the plaintiff recovers nothing under the loss
122
123
of chance theory. In Falcon v. Memorial Hospital, the Court refused to state what constitutes a threshold showing of substantial
124
chances but it does not have to be more than 50%. Even though the
125
Court did not clearly explain its rationale, a possible explanation
may be that below a certain threshold, e.g., 1 or 2%, the calculation of
damages becomes too speculative. It seems, however, that the Supreme Court of Michigan could have framed this threshold requirement in terms of causation rather than calculation of damages. As
Professor King noted in his seminal article, “[i]t is not uncommon for
courts to apply the concept of causation to matters of valuation as
126
well as causation.” Professor King believed that this practice, that he
refers to as a “melding of concepts,” is more than a “matter of style or
127
nomenclature;” it has often affected the courts decisions. The Supreme Court of Michigan should have found that in absence of evidence of a loss of “substantial chance,” the injury was too speculative
to trigger the defendant’s liability.
Alternatively, the evaluation of damages can be left for the jury
128
to decide. In LeBlanc v. Barry, the Louisiana Third District Court of
Appeal recognized that a loss of chance was a “particular cognizable
129
The
loss” that cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty.
Court held that the fact finder should make a “subjective determina130
tion of the value of that loss.”
It should be noted that an author offered yet another way to cal131
culate damages in loss of chance cases. In a law review article, Zaven
T. Saroyan advocated a new approach to damages: the relative propor132
tionality approach. The author rejected the proportional approach
133
because of its “unfairness” in calculating damages. The author criticized the fact that the traditional approach only takes into account the
absolute percentage of the chances lost, and not the proportion of
134
chances that have been affected by the defendant’s tortious conduct.
Going to the example used earlier, where the patient had a 40%
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 56-57 (holding that a 37.5% chance of survival was substantial).
Id.
King, supra note 20, at 1355.
Id.
LeBlanc v. Barry, 790 So. 2d 75, 81 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Saroyan, supra note 12, at 15.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 38.
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chance of survival and lost 20% due to the defendant’s negligence, the
proportional approach will take into account the loss of 20% chance,
whereas the relative proportionality approach will take into account
the percentage of chance lost relative to the percentage of chance the
patient initially had, i.e., 50%. The author proposed the following
formula: (.5) x [(the proportion of loss) x (the remaining value of the
135
injured person’s life)]. The author assumed that plaintiffs who lost
more than 50% chance of recovery will be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, more likely than not,
136
caused the unfavorable outcome. Since the patient losing more than
50% chance will be compensated for the value of the unfavorable outcome, the author arbitrarily assigned a multiplier of .5 to calculate the
137
damages of those who lost less than 50% chance of chances.
In the example used earlier, the patient had a 40% chance of survival and lost 20% of it as a result of the negligence of the defendant.
The damages for death are valued at $1 million. Under the proportional approach, the patient would recover 20% of 1 million, i.e.,
$200,000. Under the relative proportionality approach, the patient
would recover $250,000: .5 x 50% x $1 million.
138
This approach is interesting but not compelling. It offers the
advantage of deterring tortious conduct even when a patient had very
few chances of a favorable outcome to begin with. For example, a
plaintiff who had a 2% chance of survival and lost 2% of it will recover $500,000 under the relative proportionality approach instead of
$20,000 under the proportional approach. The multiplier .5, however,
is arbitrary. Additionally, it tends to both overcompensate and undercompensate a plaintiff. A plaintiff who had few chances of a favorable
outcome and lost them all will be overcompensated, while a plaintiff
who had initially a lot of chance but lost a small percentage relative to
his initial chance will be undercompensated. For example, under the
relative proportionality approach, a plaintiff who had 3% chance of
survival and lost only 2% of it will recover $333,300, while a plaintiff
who had a 30% chance of survival and lost 10% of it will only recover
139
$166,650. To this day, no court has endorsed this theory.

135

Id.
Id. at 37-38.
137 Id.
138 Brief for Virginia P. Foley, Appellant, Foley v. St. Joseph Health Servs. of R.I., 899 A.2d
1271 (R.I. 2006) (No. 05-90 ), 2005 WL 5903753, at *23 (finding the theory uncompelling).
139 Some litigants have mentioned the theory but to dismiss it. Id.; Foley v. St. Joseph
Health Servs. of R.I., 899 A.2d 1271, 1281 (R.I. 2006) (affirming judgment as a matter of law
against the plaintiff).
136
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Finally, the calculation of damages for loss of chance does not ex140
clude the availability of punitive damages. As the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts pointed out in Matsuyama, “[w]here gross negligence is
found in a loss of chance case, the fact finder will determine an
amount of punitive damages exactly as in any other gross negligence
case: according to the fact finder’s determination of the egregiousness
of the tortious conduct or in accordance with any statutorily pre141
scribed amount.”
5. Tort Reform Considerations
Another criticism of the theory is that it creates a new cause of
action in medical malpractice, an area that already is plagued with an
142
unsustainable degree of litigation. The American Medical Association estimates the annual cost of defensive medicine to be over $200
143
billion in healthcare costs. Since the mid-1970s, in the wake of rising
premiums and a reduction in the number of firms offering coverage to
health care providers, many states adopted new regulations to reduce
144
medical tort litigation. These reforms have included damage caps on
economic and non-economic damages, limitation on joint and several
liability of health care providers, statutory caps on attorney’s fees, as
well as offset rules that reduce the award by the amount the plaintiff
145
will receive from other sources. The recognition of the theory of loss
of chance, therefore, seems to go against the tide of the states’ continued efforts to reduce medical malpractice litigation.
The theory was born in the United States out of the dissatisfac146
tion with the “all or nothing” rule of tort. According to this rule, a
plaintiff who is able to prove that the defendant’s negligence more
likely than not caused the ultimate outcome will recover damages for
147
the ultimate outcome. On the contrary, the plaintiff who is not able
140 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 847 n.61 (Mass. 2008) (“Our decision today
should not be construed to suggest that a finding of gross negligence and an award of punitive
damages cannot be secured in a loss of chance case.”)
141 Id.
142 See Bernie Monegain, AMA Asserts Insurers Waste $200 Billion a Year on Inefficiencies,
HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (July 21, 2009), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/amaasserts-insurers-waste-200-billion-year-inefficiencies.
143 See Philip K. Howard, Why Medical Malpractice Is Off Limits, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204488304574432853190155972.html; see
also Monegain, supra note 142.
144 Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the Impact of
State
Tort
Reform,
HEALTH
AFF.
(Jan.
21,
2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/suppl/2004/01/21/hlthaff.w4.20v1.DC1.
145 Id.
146 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 829-30.
147 Id.
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to prove that the defendant’s negligence more likely than not caused
148
the ultimate outcome will recover nothing. Thus, courts often have
held that when tortious conduct caused a plaintiff to lose 51% chance
of a favorable outcome, this plaintiff could recover the damages
149
equivalent to the entire outcome. In contrast, if the plaintiff had lost
150
only 49% chance of a favorable outcome, he would recover nothing.
The “all or nothing” rule precludes recovery for the loss of chance and
overcompensates the victim who lost 51% or more chance of a better
outcome.
The loss of chance theory, on the other hand, allows recovery for
the loss of chance but it also extinguishes the possibility of recovery
151
for the final outcome. In our prior example, the patient had 40%
chance of recovery. Let us assume that he had a 51% chance of survival instead and that the negligence caused this chance to be lost.
Under the traditional rule of tort, the patient will be able to prove that
the negligence, more likely than not, caused the final outcome. Accordingly, the patient will recover the full amount, i.e., $1 million. Under the theory of loss of chance, however, assuming that the proportional award method applies, the plaintiff would recover only for the
51% chance lost. Accordingly, his award will be limited to $510,000.
There, in the situations where the patients had more than an even
chance of a better outcome, the theory of loss of chance limits the
amount of the award available. In Scafidi v. Seiler, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey remanded a case for new trial because the jury received
no instruction regarding the fact that plaintiffs’ damages should have
been limited to the value of the lost chance for recovery attributable
152
to defendant’s negligence.
The theory of loss of chance also fulfills a very important objective of negligence law: deterring wrongful actions that have caused
harm. Otherwise, the “all or nothing” rule provides a “blanket release
from liability” for doctors and hospitals any time there is less than a
153
50% chance of survival, “regardless of how flagrant the negligence.”
Despite these arguments, legislatures have on two occasions enacted statutes specifically repudiating state supreme court decisions

148
149
150
151
152
153

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 838-41 (compensating the plaintiff for the loss of chance and not the death).
Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 406-07 (N.J. 1990).
Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477 (Wash. 1983).
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allowing recovery for a loss of chance. This happened in Michigan
155
and in South Dakota.
The theory of loss of chance, nonetheless, slowly has gained acceptance, even though the states remain divided on the issue.
II. AN UNEVEN IMPLEMENTATION AMONG THE FIFTY STATES
Despite a heterogeneous implementation of the theory, several
156
trends can be identified in the United States. In some instances, the
157
courts have distorted the traditional principles of tort law.
A. The Trends Across the United States
158

Three trends can be identified across the United States.
Some
states deny recovery for the loss of chance, which is the “traditional
159
approach.” Some states refuse to recognize the theory and instead
indemnify the loss of the favorable outcome through the use of a relaxed causation requirement, which is the “relaxed causation ap160
proach.” Some states endorse the theory, which is the “proportional
161
approach.” There are, however, a few states that have yet to address
162
the theory of loss of chance.

154 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912a (2012) (repudiating O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med.
Ctr., 791 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Mich. 2010)).
155 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.1 (2012) (repudiating Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366
(S.D. 2000)).
156 SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 272-73.
157 See, e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp.,
Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits, 664
P.2d at 474.
158 SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 272-73.
159 See, e.g., United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Del. 1994) (holding that the
first approach, the “traditional approach,” is to reject the theory as being contrary to traditional
principles of tort causation); see also Peterson v. Ocean Radiology Assocs., P.C., 951 A.2d 606, 609
(Conn. 2008); Contois v. Town of W. Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019, 1023 (R.I. 2004).
160 See, e.g., Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d at 1100 (holding that the second approach, the “relaxed
causation approach,” is to adopt the theory as an exception to traditional causation standards);
see also Peterson, 951 A.2d at 609; Contois, 865 A.2d at 1023.
161 See, e.g., Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d at 1100 (holding that the third approach, the “proportional approach,” is to adopt the theory as a method of compensating the lost chance of survival,
rather than the death itself); see also Peterson, 951 A.2d at 609; Contois, 865 A.2d at 1023.
162 For example, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah and Rhode Island have yet to address the
theory.
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1. The Adoption of the Theory
A minority of the states has adopted the theory of loss of chance,
163
164
165
166
167
including Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illi168
169
170
171
172
173
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri,
174
175
176
177
178
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
179
180
181
182
183
Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Delaware has adopted the theory but through a tortuous path.
184
First, in United States v. Cumberbatch, where the family of a patient
who died from pneumococcal meningitis sued to recover under the
state wrongful death statute, the Supreme Court of Delaware held
that the theory of loss of chance was incompatible with the wrongful
death statute because the statute created a cause of action only when
185
the negligence caused the death. This holding is consistent with the
argument that a tortfeasor who only caused a loss of chance cannot be
liable for the ultimate outcome. Soon after Cumberbatch, the Supreme Court of Delaware was faced with the issue of increased risk of

163 See Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 616 (Ariz. 1984) (finding that a
possible increase in chance of harm was an issue of causation and therefore a question for the
jury).
164 Sharp v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo., 710 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Colo. App. 1985), aff’d,
741 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1987) (finding that a possible increase in chance of harm was an issue of
causation and therefore a question for the jury). But see Reigel v. SavaSeniorCare L.L.C., 292
P.3d 977, 987 (Colo. App. 2011), (finding that the analysis in Sharp was inconsistent with the
traditional but-for test), reh’g denied (Jan. 26, 2012), cert. denied, No. 12SC134, 2012 WL 5835530
(Colo. 2012).
165 See United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 75 (Del. 1995).
166 See Richmond Cmty. Hosp. Auth. Operating Univ. Hosp. v. Dickerson, 356 S.E.2d 548,
550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
167 See McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 75 (9th Cir. 1972).
168 See Holton v. Mem’l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ill. 1997).
169 See Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535, 541 (Ind. 2000).
170 See DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986).
171 See Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713, 722 (La. 1986).
172 See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass. 2008).
173 See Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Mo. 1992).
174 See Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 827-28 (Mont. 1985).
175 See Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991).
176 See Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1984).
177 See Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1282 (N.M. 1999).
178 See Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff’d,
374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. 1975).
179 See Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484 (Ohio 1996).
180 See Brown v. Koulizakis, 331 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Va. 1985).
181 See Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316, 324-25 (W. Va. 1983).
182 See Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754, 762 (Wis. 1990).
183 See McMackin v. Johnson Cnty. Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094, 1100 (Wyo. 2003).
184 United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Del. 1994).
185 Id. at 1099.
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187

harm. In United States v. Anderson, the late diagnosis of testicular
cancer had exposed the patient to a risk of recurrence of this cancer, a
188
risk that would have been avoided with a timely diagnosis. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the “loss of chance and increased
risk of harm both rely on similar theoretical underpinnings,” concluded it was necessary to consider them together, and recognized
189
they were recoverable injuries.
2. The Rejection of the Theory
190

Most states and the District of Columbia have chosen the “all or
191
192
193
nothing approach.” They include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
194
195
196
197
198
199
California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland,
200
201
202
203
204
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina,
205
206
207
208
New Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten209
210
211
nessee, Texas, and Vermont.
Connecticut seems to allow recovery for loss of chance, but in fact
requires that the plaintiff originally have more than a fifty percent

186

United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 75 (Del. 1995).
See id.
188 Id. at 75.
189 Id.
190 The District of Columbia seemed to have adopted the theory in Ferrell v. Rosenbaum,
but went back to the traditional torts principles in Grant v. American National Red Cross. See
Ferrell v. Rosenbaum, 691 A.2d 641, 650 (D.C. 1997); see also Grant v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 745
A.2d 316, 321-22 (D.C. 2000).
191 See McAfee v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 641 So. 2d 265, 267 (Ala. 1994).
192 See Crosby v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 924, 930 (D. Alaska 1999).
193 See Holt ex rel. Estate of Holt v. Wagner, 43 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Ark. 2001).
194 See Williams v. Wraxall, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 666 (Ct. App. 1995).
195 See Boone v. William W. Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2005).
196 See Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (Fla. 1984).
197 See Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 830 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Idaho 1992).
198 See Kemper v. Gordon, 272 S.W.3d 146, 152-53 (Ky. 2008).
199 See Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 215 (Md. 1990).
200 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a (West 2012); O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med.
Ctr., 791 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Mich. 2010).
201 See Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1993).
202 See Ladner v. Campbell, 515 So. 2d 882, 888 (Miss. 1987).
203 See Rankin v. Stetson, 749 N.W.2d 460, 469 (Neb. 2008).
204 See Day v. Brant, 697 S.E.2d 345, 356 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Day v. Brant, 721 S.E.2d 238,
251 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012), review denied, 726 S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 2012).
205 See Pillsbury-Flood v. Portsmouth Hosp., 512 A.2d 1126, 1130 (N.H. 1986).
206 See Drollinger v. Mallon, 260 P.3d 482, 491 (Or. 2011).
207 See Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 373 (S.C. 1995).
208 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.1 (2012).
209 See Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 600 (Tenn. 1993).
210 See Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 404 (Tex. 1993).
211 See Smith v. Parrott, 833 A.2d 843, 848 (Vt. 2003).
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chance of a favorable outcome. In Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that “it is not sufficient
for a lost chance plaintiff to prove merely that a defendant’s negligent
conduct has deprived him or her of some chance; in Connecticut, such
plaintiff must prove that the negligent conduct more likely than not
213
affected the actual outcome.”
214
Mississippi follows a similar approach. In Ladner v. Campbell,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that “Mississippi law does not
permit recovery of damages because of mere diminishment of the
215
‘chance of recovery.’” Instead, the Court added, “[r]ecovery is allowed only when the failure of the physician to render the required
level of care results in the loss of a reasonable probability of substan216
tial improvement of the plaintiff’s condition.” In Phillips v. Eastern
217
Maine Medical Center, where a personal representative of the estate
of a deceased patient of a hospital filed a medical malpractice action
against the hospital for failure to detect and repair an esophageal tear,
the Supreme Court of Maine recognized that some jurisdictions require the plaintiff to show a better than even chance of avoiding harm
218
in the absence of medical negligence and some do not. The Court
concluded that the plaintiff had proven that without the defendant’s
negligence the patient would have had a better than even chance of
219
survival.
Therefore, the plaintiff satisfied the more stringent requirement, and the Court did not rule on whether a less than even
220
chance would be a cognizable claim under Maine common law.
In North Carolina, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
issue of loss of chance, but the Court of Appeals recognized a claim
for loss of chance, as long as the patient would have had a better than
221
51% chance of a favorable outcome.
Michigan adopted the theory of loss of chance but for only a brief
period of time. In 1990, in Falcon v. Memorial Hospital, the Supreme
Court recognized that “the loss of opportunity of avoiding physical
222
harm” is a compensable injury.
In Falcon, a nineteen year-old
woman suffered a complete respiratory and cardiac collapse moments
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

Boone v. William W. Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2005).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Ladner v. Campbell, 515 So. 2d 882 (Miss. 1987).
Id. at 888.
Id. at 888-89.
Phillips v. E. Me. Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306 (Me. 1989).
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id.
See Day v. Brant, 697 S.E.2d 345, 356 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Mich. 1990).
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after delivering a healthy baby and suddenly died. The autopsy report confirmed that an amniotic fluid embolism had caused the
224
death. The health care providers attending the patient had failed to
insert, before the delivery, an intravenous line, which could have been
225
used to infuse life-saving fluids into the patient’s circulatory system.
226
As a result, the patient lost a 37.5% opportunity of surviving. The
Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged that the question whether
227
the defendants had caused the death could not be readily answered,
but also that the defendant had created this uncertainty. The Supreme
Court reasoned:
Had the defendants in the instant case inserted an intravenous
line, one of two things would have happened, Nena Falcon would
have lived, or she would have died. There would be no uncertainty whether the omissions of the defendants caused her death.
Falcon’s destiny would have been decided by fate and not possi228
bly by her health care providers.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that by reducing the patient’s opportunity of living, the defendants caused harm to the patient, although it could not have been said with certainty that the defendants
229
caused the patient’s death. This harm should subject the defendants
230
to liability.
Three years later, the Michigan Legislature amended its medical
malpractice statute to repudiate Falcon and prohibit the recovery of
“a loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a
231
better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%.” In 1997,
232
in Weymers v. Khera, the Supreme Court of Michigan had to rule on
a medical malpractice case that had accrued before the effective date
233
of the statute. The plaintiff presented evidence that the defendants’
negligence caused her to lose a 30 to 40% chance to retain the func234
235
tioning of her kidneys. The Supreme Court held that Falcon had

223

Id. at 49.
Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 49-50.
229 Id. at 52.
230 Id.
231 Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912a (2012); O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 791 N.W.2d
853, 857 (Mich. 2010) (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912a(2) (2012)).
232 Weymers v. Khera, 563 N.W.2d 647 (Mich. 1997).
233 See id. at 652-53.
234 Id. at 651-53.
224
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recognized that only a loss of chance of survival was a compensable
236
injury. Accordingly, the Court refused to extend Falcon to a loss of
chance to achieve a better result and reasoned that no cause of action
existed for the loss of an opportunity to avoid physical harm less than
237
death. Later on, applying the statute, the Michigan Supreme Court
systemically rejected loss of chance claims, compensating only patients
that could prove that the defendant, more likely than not, caused the
238
patient’s injury.
South Dakota followed the same path. In 2000, the South Da239
kota Supreme Court held, in Jorgenson v. Vener, that the loss of
240
chance doctrine was recognized at common law in that state.
In
Jorgenson, contrary to Falcon, the plaintiff sued not for a loss of
241
chance of survival, but for the loss of chance of a better outcome.
The plaintiff had injured his leg and alleged that his physician, by failing to diagnose a chronic infection, had caused him to lose a chance to
242
save his limb. The Supreme Court of South Dakota, after reviewing
the pros and cons of the theory, held that a loss of chance was an ac243
tionable injury. The adoption of the loss of chance doctrine, wrote
Chief Justice Miller on behalf of the court, “properly balances the
competing concerns of a patient who receives negligent treatment,
against those of the doctor who practices in the inherently inexact
244
science of medicine.”
Following Jorgenson, the legislature expressly abrogated
Jorgenson because the legislature found that the theory improperly
245
altered or eliminated the requirement of proximate causation. Ac235 Not surprisingly, the opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court was written by a dissenter
of the Falcon decision, Chief Justice Riley. See Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 58 (Mich.
1990); Weymers, 563 N.W.2d at 652.
236 Weymers, 563 N.W.2d at 652. But see Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 52 (holding that “the loss of
opportunity of avoiding physical harm” is an injury) (emphasis added).
237 See Weymers, 563 N.W.2d at 652.
238 O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 791 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Mich. 2010) (reversing a
decision of the Court of Appeals because the decision treated the plaintiff’s claim as a loss-ofopportunity claim instead of a traditional medical malpractice claim).
239 Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366 (S.D. 2000).
240 Id. at 366.
241 Id. at 367.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 371.
244 Id.
245 The language of the statute was the following: “[t]he Legislature finds that in those
actions founded upon an alleged want of ordinary care or skill the conduct of the responsible
party must be shown to have been the proximate cause of the injury complained of. The Legislature also finds that the application of the so called loss-of-chance doctrine in such cases improperly alters or eliminates the requirement of proximate causation. Therefore, the rule in Jorgenson
v. Vener, 2000 SD 87, 616 N.W. 2d 366 (2000) is hereby abrogated.” S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-1.1
(2012).
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cordingly, the courts of South Dakota subsequently rejected claims
246
based on the theory of loss of chance.
The arguments supporting the rejection of the theory are not always convincing though. In Gooding v. University Hospital Building
247
Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question
of “whether a theory of recovery for loss of a chance to survive predi248
cated upon alleged medical malpractice is actionable in Florida.”
The court rejected the theory and refused to allow recovery for a loss
249
of less than even chances of a favorable outcome. The court held
250
that relaxing the causation requirement could create an injustice.
The court further explained that “[h]ealth care providers could find
themselves defending cases simply because a patient fails to improve
or where serious disease processes are not arrested because another
251
course of action could possibly bring a better result.” This argument
is a distorted view of the theory of loss of chance. The theory only
requires that healthcare providers be answerable for a patient’s loss of
chance of recovery caused by their negligence. The theory does not
create a heightened duty to cure or save patients.
3. The Distortion of the Theory Through the Use of a Relaxed
Causation Requirement
252

253

254

Some states, including Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
255
Washington, have adopted the theory of loss of chance, but with the
qualifier that the theory is a relaxation of the traditional causation
requirement. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that “the loss of
chance of recovery theory basically entails the adoption of a different
256
standard of causation than usually applies in negligence cases.”
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the theory of loss
of chance was developed to “relax the standard for sufficiency of
257
proof of causation ordinarily required of a plaintiff.”
246 See, e.g., Smith v. Bubak, 643 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 2011) (excluding expert testimony showing that the plaintiff had approximately a fifty-eight percent chance of at least a
partial recovery because the testimony had become irrelevant under South Dakota’s proximate
cause statute, and thus was not admissible).
247 Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
248 Id. at 1017.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1019.
251 Id. at 1019-20.
252 See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 183 (Kan. 1994).
253 See McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 469 (Okla. 1987).
254 See Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978).
255 See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476-77 (Wash. 1983).
256 Delaney, 873 P.2d at 182.
257 McKellips, 741 P.2d at 471.
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By asserting that the theory is a relaxation of the traditional causation requirement, these courts suggest that there should be a causal
link, even weak, between the wrongful act and the ultimate outcome.
This should not be the case. The injury at issue is the loss of chance
and, therefore, the inquiry into whether there is causation between the
258
wrongful act and the ultimate outcome is irrelevant.
4. The States That Have Yet to Address the Theory of Loss of
Chance
The states of North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah have yet to address the theory of loss of chance. In Joshi v. Providence Health Sys259
tem of Oregon Corporation, the Supreme Court of Oregon declared
that loss of chance claims are incompatible with the Oregon wrongful
260
death statute. This decision is, therefore, similar to the decision of
261
the Supreme Court of Delaware in Cumberbatch. It recognizes that
a tortfeasor who only caused a loss of chance cannot be liable for the
262
ultimate outcome. It does not indicate, however, how the Supreme
Court of Oregon would rule on a claim seeking only the recovery of a
loss of chance.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has not addressed directly
263
the issue of a loss of chance. In Seale v. Gowans, where the defendants had failed to diagnose the patient’s breast cancer, the plaintiff
appealed a directed verdict in favor of the defendants, who had successfully argued that the action was time-barred. The Supreme Court
of Utah held that a decrease in a patient’s chance of survival, without
proof of actual damages, was not adequate to sustain a cause of action
264
for negligence damages. By this statement, the Court meant that the
decrease of the patient’s chance of survival did not trigger the running
of the statute of limitations. The Court did not recognize or reject the
theory of loss of chance.
Finally, in Rhode Island, the Supreme Court declined to adopt or
265
reject the theory. The Supreme Court did not deem the facts in previous Rhode Island cases to be appropriate for the application of the

258

See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 832 (Mass. 2008).
Joshi v. Providence Health Sys. of Or. Corp., 149 P.3d 1164, 1170 (Or. 2006).
260 Id. at 1170; see Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.020 (2012).
261 See U. S. v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098, 1099 (Del. 1994).
262 See Joshi, 149 P.3d at 1170.
263 Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996).
264 Id. at 1365.
265 Almonte v. Kurl, 46 A.3d 1, 24 (R.I. 2012) (citing Contois v. W. Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019,
1025 (R.I. 2004)).
259
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loss of chance doctrine, but acknowledged that the theory could be
266
revisited under the appropriate fact scenario.
B.

Towards Better Practices

While many state courts apply the loss of chance theory correctly,
many others have relied on arguments that reveal either a misunderstanding of the theory or a distortion of the traditional principles of
tort. It is important to (1) maintain the well-established principles of
negligence and (2) avoid arbitrary distinctions between the patients
who have more than even chances and patients who have less than
even chances of a favorable outcome.
1. The Importance of Maintaining the Well-Established Principles of Negligence
There is a contradiction between: (1) relaxing the requirements of
causation between the wrongful act and the unfavorable outcome; and
(2) indemnifying the loss of chance not the unfavorable outcome. It
violates two basic principles of negligence: the requirement of proof of
267
causation and the plaintiff’s entitlement to a full recovery.
In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, an estate sued a hospital and a physician for failure to timely diagnose the
268
decedent’s lung cancer on his first visit to the hospital. The estate
proved that the hospital’s and physician’s negligence proximately
269
caused a 14% reduction in the decedent’s chances of survival. The
Supreme Court of Washington held en banc that a patient with less
than a 50% chance of survival could recover under the wrongful death
statute because a reduction of chance of survival from 39 to 25% is
sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the
270
jury.
This approach is problematic because the court recognized that
the defendants were liable only for a loss of chance and not for the
death of the plaintiff, yet the defendants were held accountable under
271
the wrongful death statute.
Pursuant to the Washington statute,
“[w]hen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or
default of another his or her personal representative may maintain an
action for damages against the person causing the death; and although

266
267
268
269
270
271

Id.
King, supra note 20, at 1370.
Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 474 (Wash. 1983).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 476-77.
Wash. Rev. Code § 4.20.010 (2011).
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the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount,
272
in law, to a felony.”
In his concurrence, Justice Pearson stated:
The wrongful death statute is probably the principal reason the
parties focused on the death of Mr. Herskovits rather than his
diminished chance of survival. As I have endeavored to demonstrate, this approach leads either to harsh and arbitrary results, or
to distortions of existing tort principles and the potential for confusion. A liberal construction of the statute appears a more effective method of achieving the most desirable end. The word
“cause” has a notoriously elusive meaning (as the writings on legal causation all agree) and it is certainly sufficiently flexible to
bear the interpretation I give it in the context of [the wrongful
273
death statute].
This interpretation reveals that the court relaxed the causation
standard, thus deviating from the traditional notions of tort. This
analysis suggests that when the plaintiff has met his burden of proving
proximate cause with respect to the loss of chance, the plaintiff has
somewhat also met his burden of proving proximate cause with respect to the death of the patient.
Further, by allowing the case to go to the jury, the Washington
Supreme Court entrusted the trier of fact with the difficult task of
assessing the damages for the loss of chance. Traditionally, damages
awards consist of a single lump sum that is intended to fully compen274
sate the plaintiff for all past and future consequences of the tort. In
this case, if the jury awards damages for the wrongful death, the defendants will be liable for damages they did not cause. On the other
hand, if the jury awards damages for the loss of chance, the defendants
will be liable for the damages they caused but the plaintiff will not
recover fully for the wrongful death, as per the statute.
Relaxing the causation requirement and indemnifying the loss of
chance instead of the ultimate outcome is a convoluted way of recognizing the theory. This method does not comport with the traditional
rules of negligence. Departing from well-established principles of
torts is a dangerous path that could be avoided easily by simply recognizing that the loss of chance is a type of injury.

272
273
274

Id. (emphasis added)
Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 487 n.1635.
King, supra note 20, at 1370.
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2. The Arbitrary Distinction Between More Than Even Chances
and Less Than Even Chances of a Favorable Outcome
Many courts, whether they recognize the theory of loss of chance
or reject it, recognize that a plaintiff has a cause of action only if the
275
chances he lost were more than even.
This distinction is arbitrary. As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts noted in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, “[w]here credible evidence
establishes that the plaintiff’s or decedent’s probability of survival is
49%, that conclusion is no more speculative than a conclusion, based
on similarly credible evidence, that the probability of survival is
276
51%.”
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized the perverse practical effect of the distinction in Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital:
It puts a premium on each party’s search for the willing witness.
Human nature being what it is, and the difference between scientific and legal tests for “probability” often creating confusion, for
every expert witness who evaluates the lost chance at 49% there
is another who estimates it at closer to 51%. Also, the rule tends
to defeat one of the primary functions of the tort system – deterrence of negligent conduct because cases based on statistical possibilities the rule prevents any individual in a group from recovering, even though it may be statistically irrefutable that some
277
have been injured.
The Supreme Court of Kansas also acknowledged that there are
sound reasons of public policy for not drawing a distinction between
278
the more than even and the less than even chances of recovery. The
court explained that the distinction, in essence, “declares open season
on critically ill or injured persons as care providers would be free of
liability for even the grossest malpractice if the patient had only a
fifty-fifty chance [or less] of surviving the disease or injury even with
279
proper treatment.” Accordingly, the segment of society often least
able to exercise independent judgment is at the mercy of those profes280
sionals who provide them with life-saving health care. Patients with

275 See Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (Fla. 1984) (rejecting the
theory); Grant v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 745 A.2d 316, 317 (D.C. 2000) (rejecting the theory);
Boone v. William W. Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2005) (recognizing the theory).
276 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 833 (Mass. 2008).
277 Thompson, 688 P.2d at 615.
278 Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149, 160 (Kan. 1984).
279 Id.
280 Id.
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poor prospects of recovery or survival are the most in need of protection against medical malpractice.
This distinction may be drawn because courts routinely confuse
281
causation and the burden of proof required to show causation. The
plaintiff must prove causation by preponderance of the evidence: the
defendant’s conduct, more likely than not, must have caused the in282
jury. In many of the loss of chances cases, however, the fact that the
defendant caused a loss of chance is not even at issue nor is the
283
amount of chance lost. In those cases, the plaintiff proved the loss of
284
chance to a certainty. Whether the percentage of chances lost is
above or below 50%, therefore, should not matter. In fact, when a
plaintiff proves to a certainty that the tortfeasor caused the plaintiff to
lose 51% of the chance of survival, the plaintiff actually showed to a
certainty that the causation in fact, i.e., the causal link between the
tortfeasor and the unfavorable outcome, cannot be proven. The Supreme Court of Michigan demonstrated this idea through the following examples:
To say that a patient would have had a ninety-nine percent opportunity of survival if given proper treatment, does not mean
that the physician’s negligence was the cause in fact if the patient
would have been among the unfortunate one percent who would
have died. A physician’s carelessness may, similarly, be the actual
cause of physical harm although the patient had only a one percent opportunity of surviving even with flawless medical atten285
tion.
The source of the confusion between burden of proof and percentage of chance may come from the fact that, in the United States,
the burden of proof is probabilistic and thus is explained in terms of
286
percentage. The burden of proof for civil cases, the preponderance
of the evidence, requires that more than 50% of the evidence points to
281 See, e.g., Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 47-48 (Mich. 1990) (holding that “the
more probable than not standard, as well as other standards of causation, are analytic devicestools to be used in making causation judgments,” whereas the more probable than not standard
is a burden of proof, not a standard of causation).
282 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 832 (Mass. 2008).
283 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 474-75 (Wash.
1983) (“It is undisputed that [the plaintiff] had less than a fifty percent chance of survival at all
times herein”); see also Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. 1993)
(where plaintiff offered undisputed evidence regarding the five-year survival rate of cervical
cancer).
284 Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 480; Kramer, 858 S.W.2d at 399.
285 Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 47.
286 Preponderance of the Evidence, LEGAL INFO. INST. (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:22 PM),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponderance_of_the_evidence.
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287

plaintiff’s allegations. This is a low threshold. In civil law countries,
the threshold is often much higher and requires that a plaintiff prove
288
the truth of his or her allegations. A civil law plaintiff must prove
289
each element of a claim to a certainty. Accordingly, in a civil law
country, a loss of chance, whether greater or lesser than 50%, can
never give rise to a cause of action for the compensation of the ultimate outcome. The theory of loss of chance, therefore, comes to fill
the gap and indemnify the loss of a favorable outcome. In the United
States, on the contrary, the theory of loss of chance interferes with the
290
probabilistic approach to causation. In cases where the plaintiff lost
more than 50% chance of a favorable outcome, the theory of loss of
chance allows the plaintiff to recover damages for the loss of chance,
whereas the probabilistic approach to causation allows the plaintiff to
recover damages for the ultimate outcome, not just the loss of chance.
The stark contrast between civil and common law countries may explain the U.S. courts’ reticence to adopt the theory and the persisting
confusion surrounding its application.
3. The Legislative Option
Considering the obstacles to the implementation of the theory of
loss of chance, the most appropriate way to recognize or reject the
theory may be through the enactment of a statute. So far, state legislatures have intervened only to reject the theory of loss of chance once
291
courts had recognized its application. In none of the fifty states has
a legislature taken the initiative to enact a statute expressly allowing
recovery for loss of chance. Implementing the theory through legislation, however, may be a more democratic and systematic way of recognizing it. A public debate involving all the actors affected by the
proposed legislation would be beneficial both to determining the financial implications of implementing the theory and to evaluating the
constituents’ positions on the issue. The legislature could consider
imposing limits to the application of the theory, i.e., prohibiting punitive damages, defining the method of evaluation of the injury, and deciding if the injury of loss of chance should be indemnified when the
ultimate outcome is certain but has not yet come to pass.
287

Id.
Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 243 (2002).
289 See id.
290 See id.
291 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2912a (2012) (abrogating Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462
N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990)); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-1.1 (2012) (abrogating Jorgenson v. Vener,
616 N.W.2d 366, 366 (S.D. 2000)).
288
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More importantly, legislatures would have the opportunity of
considering whether the loss of chance should be limited to the medical malpractice area and why it should be so. Many jurisdictions have
expressed why the loss of chance is particularly suited to the medical
292
malpractice area. In Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc.,
the Ohio Supreme Court explained:
Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in malpractice cases where physical well being, and life itself, are the
subject of litigation. The strong intuitive sense of humanity tends
to emotionally direct us toward a conclusion that in an action for
wrongful death an injured person should be compensated for the
293
loss of any chance for survival, regardless of its remoteness.
In Matsuyama, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts recognized
that medical malpractice cases are “particularly well suited” to appli294
cation of the loss of chance theory for several reasons. First, reliable
expert evidence documenting situations of loss of chance are more
likely to occur in the area of medical malpractice than in other areas
295
of negligence. Second, in a doctor-patient relationship, there is an
expectation that “the physician will take every reasonable measure to
296
obtain an optimal outcome for the patient.” Third, many patients
find themselves in a situation where they have a less than even chance
of survival or of achieving a better outcome at the time of diagnosis,
and therefore are faced with the shortcomings of the all or nothing
297
rule. Finally, “failure to recognize loss of chance in medical malpractice actions forces the party who is the least capable of preventing the

292 Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), overruled by
Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996).
293 Id. at 103-04 (holding that a plaintiff could maintain action for loss of less than even
chance of recovery or survival by presenting expert medical testimony showing that health care
provider’s negligent act or omission increased risk of harm to plaintiff); see also Herskovits v.
Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 491 (Wash. 1983) (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
294 Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 834-35 (Mass. 2008). The court relied on Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 26 comment that addressed the theory
of loss of chance. Current versions of the third restatement do not address the theory.
295 Id.; see also Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 371 (S.D. 2000) (citing King, supra note
20, at 1386 n.111) (“The fact that the doctrine has thus far only been applied in a medical malpractice context in all likelihood derives from the availability of statistical probabilities in the
field of medical science; such information is not widely available in other malpractice contexts.”).
296 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 835 (quoting K.S. ABRAHAM, FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF
TORT LAW 117–18 (3d ed. 2007) (arguing that “health care providers undertake to maximize a
patient’s chances of survival, [and so] their failure to do so should be actionable. Ordinary actors
who negligently risk causing harm have not undertaken such a duty”)).
297 Id.
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harm to bear the consequences of the more capable party’s negli298
gence.”
Very few courts, however, have addressed the issue of loss of
299
300
chance in other contexts. In Doll v. Brown, a federal employee
brought action under the Rehabilitation Act alleging that he was dis301
criminated against by reason of a medical condition. The complications of his throat cancer prevented him temporarily from working
302
around heavy dust. Over time, although he had recovered his ability
to work around heavy dust, his superiors refused to reinstate him to
303
his prior position. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the theory of loss of chance is “peculiarly ap304
propriate in employment cases involving competitive promotion,”
but denied to hold that the theory was applicable to the case because
305
the issue had not been briefed by the parties.
306
In Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., the widow of a seaman sued a vessel owner and the vessel because the master of the vessel made no attempt to search the sea to rescue the seaman in the
307
hours after the seaman was reported missing. The parties presented
evidence that if the seaman had gone overboard not long before he
was reported missing, a search would have had a “reasonable expecta308
tion of success.” In other words, because there was some range of
time and distance in which rescue would have been possible if attempted, the inaction of the master of the vessel caused the seaman to
309
lose a chance of being rescued. The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia rendered a judgment for the defen310
dants. On appeal, the representative of the vessel argued that the
plaintiff had not proved proximate cause, since the plaintiff could not
definitely show that the seaman was alive when he went missing and
311
could have been saved.
298
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
judgment and held that the defendants were liable for the loss of the
312
seaman. The court found that under the universal custom of the sea,
as well as under the seaman’s contract, the master had an obligation to
313
search in good faith for the lost crew member. The court further
determined that this duty was “of such nature that its omission will
314
contribute to cause the seaman’s death.” The court, therefore, did
not frame the issue in terms of loss of chance but in terms of contribu315
tory negligence. In Hicks, however, where the Fourth Circuit Court
316
of Appeals addressed the theory of chance for the first time, the
court referred to the Gardner case to support its argument that a
plaintiff cannot be required to prove to an “absolute certainty what
would have happened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not
317
allow to come to pass.”
Arguably, the idea of loss of chance, or rather loss of opportunity,
318
has been addressed in a few instances in the area of contracts. For
319
example, in Miller v. Allstate Insurance, an insurer breached a promise to return a wrecked automobile, which the insured needed as evi320
dence in a planned products liability suit against a manufacturer.
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal held that the insured could
recover against the insurer for the lost chance of winning the product
321
liability case. The court found that it is now an “accepted principle
of contract law . . . that recovery will be allowed where a plaintiff has
been deprived of an opportunity or chance to gain an award or profit
322
even where damages are uncertain.”
These few and isolated references to loss of chance or opportunity, however, are insufficient to conclude that the theory has been
accepted in areas other than medical malpractice. These cases, nonetheless, present situations where the theory would be well-suited and
would deserve more attention on the part of the legislatures.
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The theory of loss of chance has gained in understanding since it
323
first appeared in the United States almost half a century ago. Yet,
the majority of the states continues to reject it, sometimes based on
324
flawed arguments. The American probabilistic approach to causation has been an undeniable obstacle to the theory’s broader accep325
tance among the states. Some states, nonetheless, have chosen to
disregard the imperfection inherent in the theory and acknowledge
that the recognition of a loss of chance as a cognizable injury better
achieves the two ultimate goals of the civil justice system: deterrence
and compensation.
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